


MALIK HASSAN

University of Maria Curie-Skłodowska, Lublin, Poland,

 0009-0005-7208-2935

The Nature of Civil Conflict and the Rise of Islamic Militancy in Somalia

In the complex tapestry of global security concerns, the intersection of civil conflict and the rise of Islamic militancy in specific regions have garnered increasing attention. This paper focuses on the situation in Somalia, a country long riven by internal war and now struggling with the rise of Islamic militarism. The country's history has been marred by prolonged periods of internal strife characterized by political instability, clan rivalries, and state collapse. Against this backdrop, Islamic militant groups, notably Al-Shabaab, have risen to prominence, exploiting the power vacuum and societal grievances to propagate their extremist ideology. Therefore, this paper aims to unravel the nuanced interplay between the nature of civil conflict and the ascent of Islamic militancy, shedding light on the historical, socioeconomic, and governance-related elements that have facilitated this convergence. By examining these dynamics, this paper underscores the imperative of effectively addressing root causes to mitigate the influence of Islamic militancy in Somalia.

Key words: civil war, Islamic militarism, Somalia, clan leaders, conflict, warlords, peace building.

Introduction

In 1960, the historical turning point occurred in the creation of the state of Somalia. This incident resulted from the merger of two separate geographic territories, the former British Somaliland and a former Italian territory under the United Nations (UN) administration. At this crucial point in the development of the Somali Republic, both of these territories had gained independence from their colonial rulers. On July 1, 1960, little more than five days later, these two separate territories united to become the Somali Republic. The founding of this country marked a turning point in the history of the Somali people since it symbolized the unification of many communities and areas into one independent state (Lewis 1980). Then, after Somalia became a democratic state, the Somali Republic quickly established universal suffrage as the cornerstone of its democratic political system, allowing every citizen to exercise their right to vote and run for government. This basic democratic structure not only allowed for the exercise of the fundamental rights of the country but also made it easier to have two separate elections for

the presidency and parliament. The ideals of civic engagement and inclusivity were maintained throughout these election procedures, demonstrating the commitment to democratic administration within the newly established Somali Republic.

Furthermore, Somalia experienced nine years of parliamentary democracy, which may have resulted in the continent's first peaceful democratic handover of power. It signifies the end of Somali President Adam Abdulle Osman's years in office and his status as the first head of state in Africa to resign following a loss in national elections (Samatar 2016). However, the democratic atmosphere and the notion of political parties reflected clan loyalty a few years later, which limited the dream of democracy in duration. Furthermore, the recently formed democratic institutions were paralyzed by insecurity, poverty, corruption, and self-rule. Then, in 1969, a bloodless coup by the military regime led by Mohamed Siyad Barre worsened the situation. The administration quickly ended the process of constitutional democracy and replaced democratic rule with a Leninist-Marxist style of government. Thus, the dictatorship regime demonstrated its reliance on the Soviet Union economically and ideologically. The military government was forcefully removed from power in 1991 by several political unions and rebel groups driven by clandestine motivations following twenty-one years of oppressive rule and violations of fundamental human rights (Elmi 2010). After the overthrow of the Barre regime, the absence of an alternative authority to assume governance left a power vacuum in Somalia. Consequently, the nation rapidly descended into anarchy and widespread devastation (Abdi 2012).

Following the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime, armed groups, civil wars, clan rivalries, warlords, pirate groups, and Islamist extremists emerged. These changes resulted in the destruction of the government and its institutions, as well as a shortage of both material and human resources. Over two million individuals were internally displaced by the violence, and dozens of others immigrated abroad (Avis-Herbert 2016). Since the overthrow of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia has not had a strong, functioning central government, which this marked as the most extended period of total state collapse in postcolonial history (Menkhaus 2007, pp. 106–424, pp. 357–390).

As it has been written by many scholars and researchers, over the past thirty years, several peace-building and reconstruction initiatives have been undertaken to end hostilities and establish an effective central administration. Over fifteen peace-building initiatives have been launched thus far, many of which have been sponsored by the United Nations Mission in Somalia. Regional organizations like IGAD also attempted to peacefully end the Somalia crisis (Mulugeta 2010). Somalia's peace-building and reconstruction efforts have also received assistance from its neighboring countries. The most notable national conferences occurred in Djibouti in 2000 and during the Nairobi Peace Conference in 2004. Nevertheless, none of these efforts have produced the expected outcomes (Khayre 2017).

Similarly, the international community has undertaken multiple attempts to restore stability to Somalia by installing a central government. For example, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized a UN military operation in Somalia on a unilateral basis. In 1992, the UN Security Council confirmed its approval to the United Nations' unilateral military operation in Somalia (Harper 2012). Operations carried out by the UN in Somalia failed to bring about stability and peace (Diprizio 2002). Nonetheless, in 2004, a transitional administration was established in

Nairobi. In 2012, Somalia achieved a crucial milestone in its political transition with the facilitation of limited and indirect elections for a new federal parliament and president, aided by the international community. Despite this progress, peace-building efforts have encountered complexities stemming from financial challenges, external actors' involvement, and internal conflict actors' presence (Harper 2012). Therefore, this paper underscores the imperative of effectively addressing root causes to mitigate the influence of Islamic militancy in Somalia. Furthermore, the study assesses mainly information of an explanatory and descriptive nature; the study relies on information collected from various sources, is based on a literature study and the available factual data, and religion, which are variables to be studied. The primary sources of information for the study are library and internet research, academic articles and journals, news sites, and internet sites that contain relevant information on the topic of the study.

The nature of the war in Somalia

Following the state collapse in 1991, the Siyad Barre dictatorship had to leave the nation due to armed clan-based movements that emerged due to bad governance practices and inequalities between different groups' access to political power and resources in the 1980s. Since then, Somalia has been an unstable state. The country, after that, experienced decades of continuous warfare and civil war as a result of various armed groups trying to control the country. After the Siyad Barre rule was overthrown, the clan-rebel groups fought for control of Somalia due to a lack of authority. Other armed groups struggled to take control of the country's capital and establish governance. The citizens of Mogadishu chose Ali Mahdi to serve as the head of the U.S.C. civilian as an interim president. However, General Aided, who led a revolution against Siyad Barre, was unhappy with Ali Mahdi's presidential nomination. However, Aided disagreed with Ali's rule and declared that he was the legitimate leader of Somalia (Elmi 2010).

Several attempts to bring these two opposing parties together were made in Djibouti in 1991, but they were unsuccessful. As a result, a bloody conflict between General Aided and his opponent Ali Mahdi started, which resulted in the deaths of up to 25,000 innocent civilians and caused the destruction of infrastructures (Clark 1993). Thus, the capital city of Mogadishu was divided in two by this deadly conflict: the north was under Ali Mahdi's control. General Aided was simultaneously in charge of the seaport and airport in the south (Abdi 2012). Due to this confusion, the Somali National Movement (S.N.M.) led government in northern Somalia, today known as Somaliland, announced its political independence from the rest of the country. On May 18, 1991, the northern part of Somalia declared itself to be the Republic of Somaliland. While the south of Somalia collapsed into chaos and conflict involving an increase in the number of militias and warlords based on clans as well as extremist militants, this has continued to hinder efforts to restore peace in the country until today.

The toppling of the Barre regime in 1991 was not the healer of Somalia's political problem since it led to Somalia's ultimate collapse. It is because the factions that led the topple were almost unprepared to govern the country itself as they did not even have a shadow structure of what would be after the overthrow. As such, when they expelled Siad Barre, different opinions

emerged between the various clan members and military groups since each wanted a share of the power to govern the state. Hence, the reign of warlords succeeded the government, with influential clan leaders, wealthy businesspeople, and small military groups, turning a lot of Somalia into a patchwork of feuds (Abdi 2012, p. 59).

Following intervention by Western powers and international institutions, the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN), through the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1993-1995, the conflict had reduced, being mostly localized and with fewer casualties as before. When militia groups boomed the 'Black Hawk' in which several US soldiers were killed, Somalia was left on its own with minimal external intervention (Abdi 2012, p. 29). In 2002, the conflicts seemed to take a more violent turn. Several factors, including political domination among powerful clans and militia groups, prompted these conflicts. Hence, in the October 2000s, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development on the Ground (IGAD) sponsored peace talks between Southern and Central Somalia into high insecurity levels (Igad Gives Somalia Nine Months to Act 2008).

Even though Somalia has one primary language and, as such, descent, the occurrence of divisions within the clans in Somalia is the most appalling. Thus, the most apparent force dividing Somalis is the clan, which knits groups of people into distinct units (Harper 2012, p. 35). Said Barre tried to eliminate the clan system when he introduced 'scientific socialism' in the 1970s. The issue of the clan also seemed quite crucial in the various attempts of reconciliation efforts such as negotiation and mediation processes, especially regarding clear representation of the various clans.

Following the 2002–2004 Somali peace process held in Mbagathi, Kenya, the clan offered guidance to share power, known as the 4.5 formula, by the current government has been proposed. It claims that Darood, Hawiye, Dir, and Rahanweyn are the four main clans, and 0.5 are primarily the Bantu minorities (Harper 2012, p. 39). After Somalis and the Nairobi peace accords, a transitional federal government arrangement was produced in October 2004 in Somalia by the international organization, and a letter resulted in the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in August 2012 (Hammond 2013, p. 183–193).

Due to the instability in Somalia, various actors in the conflict have taken advantage. From the various warlords and external actors, later after led the rise of Islamism or the Islamic revival, Religion being an important identification that Somalis share, it was pretty easy for the Somalis to relate the emerging Islamist movements, and their influence was also backed by the fact that the governments that had been put to place were weak (FGS). Therefore, the Islamic movement is the main agent of the implementation of terrorist activities because it is easier for them. After all, the state emerges from chaos and forms a weak central government. Furthermore, even the acceptance of the Islamist movements by Somali society was guided by the fact that they saw that it was the Islamist movements that were looking out for their best interests. In that, they were offering aid and support, which the Western intervention aided by other countries such as Ethiopia was not keen on providing, thus producing a conducive environment for their growth (Menkhaus 2005, p. 8). On top of that, aid from outside, especially from countries like Yemen, was readily welcome; this was also due to Somalia's proximity to the Gulf States. Moreover, the area has extreme Islamist structures, and the local populations have welcomed Islamic charities

and schools sponsored by Saudi Arabia and from the Emirates of the Gulf in the absence of any State providing social and educatory services (Menkhaus 2005, p. 9).

It led to the formation of Islamist movements such as Al Ittihad Al Islamiya, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC/ICU), Hizbul Islam, and lately, Al-Shabaab, which is currently at the forefront of most of the attacks in and around Somalia. In addition to these groups are the Islamist movements Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaa (ASWJ), which is considered moderate compared to the rest. The Somalis, however, accepted most of these Islamist movements, especially since they were fearful and tired of the warlords. When the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC/ICU) seemed to be bringing stability to Mogadishu in the mid-2000s, these courts began to gather some support among the Somali population (Svenson 2012, p. 6). To them, these groups created a form of security, order, and stability. Support for the (UIC) within Somalia, which resulted in the more extreme members of the (UIC) drew unfavorable attention from the United States and Ethiopia, who were concerned that the price of peace in Somalia could be a hard-line Islamist government (Svenson 2012, p. 7). However, by 2005, Menkhaus was particularly aware of the reinforcement of Islamist dominance in Mogadishu. The Sharia courts extended their authority and employed the extreme Islamists like Hassan Dahir Aweys in regions such as Mogadishu to promote their causes and aspirations (Svenson 2012, p. 10). Menkhaus discusses how Islamic identity and allegiance have been utilized to organize Somalis in jihad efforts and have not yet been.

Al Shabaab, having utilized the organization, continues to fight fiercely efforts to reconstruct a Somali state, in part because Al-Shabaab acknowledges that its impacts would significantly decrease in a stable society to form a coalition with moderated Islamists and receive the support of or at least consent of non-Islamist leaders (Foltz 2010, p. 6). The rising radicalization of Al Shabaab, the extreme and violent ICU wing, is also attributed to Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia (Foltz 2010, p. 8).

The rise of Islamic Militancy in Somalia

The phrase "militancy of Islam" is regarded to Muslim organizations and movements that attempt to support religious, social, and political standards employing violence based on religious preferences. In other words, Islamic militancy differs from Islamic groups seeking a change of politics by peaceful methods or promoting religious changes via education and Dawa, for example, proselytizing. Also, Islamic militancy indicates a minority view within the range of Islamic beliefs (Østebø 2012).

The first version of the late 1980s Islamic militancy in Somalia arose after al Itihad al Islamia was established, and in the early 1990's it increased its military actions. Al Itihad disappeared after 1996, but his ideas and key individuals continued to take on a role within the highly varied UIC movement of the mid-2000s. In 2006, the UIC secured control of Mogadishu for many months until it was smashed in December of that year by the Ethiopian invasion (Østebø 2012).

Thus, Al-Shabaab was brought about who were more motivated to employ forceful action for their purposes by a new generation of Islamic terrorists. Al-Shabaab group saw that the govern-

ment existed by then, the transition governments were corrupt, and this was not able to meet their expectations, which is mostly because they initially hardly implemented the Shari'a law in Somalia, which is their fundamental goal. That is why the organization waged a guerrilla war that gained control of several parts of Southern Somalia. In his repertory, Al Shabaab included suicide bombing. Since 2011, several of the African Union Mission's (AMISOM) and Somali government troops' attacks have severely degraded Al Shabaab's capability, which was then joined by Kenya and Ethiopia (Østebø 2012).

The following religion, again credentialed in Somalia's political discourse, has contributed to the growth of Islamic militancy. It is because the Islamic conflict led to the emergence of militancy under the pressure of Islam; the occurrence of Islamist militancy in Somalia emerged in the situation where the government of Somalia was like a toothless dog, which after that led Somalia to be a failed state. Following the downfall of Somalia's regime and lack of state structure, warlords became fashionable in Somalia due to the absence of functional state law and order. Thus, the power increase of Islamist militants in Somalia led to changes, especially in the actors who are involved and who have influenced the conflict furthermore, this led to a drastic transformation of the Somalia conflict from a purely clan-based to an ideologically driven one (Nyamwaya 2014, p. 59).

The Islamic militancy, especially Al-Shabaab, has increased their critical activities in Somalia due to the transitional government of Somalia, which later became the federal government of Somalia, allowed foreign troops to intervene in the Somalia conflict hence Ethiopian troops, with the cooperation of the United States critical fighting with Islamic militant, especially Al-Shabaab.

Thus, from 2006 to 2009, Al-Qaeda spoke to back the Somali Mujahideen in May 2008, Al-Shabaab proclaimed support for Osama bin Laden in an effort claiming that the global Jihad against the West, Islamic extremist organizations are too violent and intellectually divided to join forces and to emphasize the sensitivities that place religion at the heart of contemporary government in all sectors of Somali society (Accords issue 21-30 Islam and Somali Social Order-2010, p. 97).

In the early ten years of the 21st century, Al-Shabaab became the paramount Jihadist organization in the East Africa region since it focused almost all its efforts on Somalia. Al-Shabaab has excellent linkage with Al-Qaeda, whose objective is currently not only to overthrow the Western-backed government that is moderate Islamist but also to join during the global Jihad declared by Al-Qaeda. Participating in the global jihad is to aid in the realization of a global Islamic caliphate, which is the agenda of the global jihadists. The Islamists argued that the government did not implement Sharia law and considered the government and its governance foreign (Accords issue 21-30 Islam and Somali Social Order-2010, p. 62).

In general, the rise of Islamic militancy in Somalia was not inevitable, like a thunderstorm during the rainy season. This is because groups such as Al-Shabab had critical agendas that led to the escalation of the Somalia conflict. The ultimate objective seems to be a pan-Islamic Caliphate for Al-Shabaab, and, thus, it is developing a relationship with Al-Qaeda. It also highlighted the considerable influence of Somalia's war on international terrorists. By contrast, Hizbul Islam aimed to build a larger Somalia in the Horn of Africa (Williams 2011, p. 140).

Religion as a Cause of Conflict in Somalia

The course of the Somalia conflict has manifested dynamics from warlord politics to militant Islamism due to the emergence of Islamic militancy-led complex on the efforts of installation peace in Somalia; this is because Islamic militancy has their religious fundamentals and principles which goes against the Somali government and international community when it comes to the peacebuilding. Hence, it is necessary to include religion as one of the important factors in international relations that cannot be neglected; this is due to the emergence of Islamic militancy in Somalia, which has shown as an actor in the conflict and created a complex of resolving the conflict, apart from that, in current world various conflicts occurred due to the religion influence. However, religion has also illustrated values that can help conflict resolution to promote sustainable peace.

Somalia is a country in which many its people follow the same religion, that is, Islam. Hence, obviously, when the country where the belief is shared is the same, there is a big chance of the emergence of conflict; therefore, for Somalia, religion has been a cause of conflict.

Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler said that Religion is a legitimate source. Almost any policy or action can be justified by it, even those usually regarded as unjustified (Fox – Sandler 2006, p 34). Hence, this is mainly when Somalis conflict with other parties whom they are in danger of their security. It was seen when the Islamist movements in Somalia announced jihad on Ethiopia with their primary aim to rescue their fellow Somalis in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. This circumstance influenced the majority of Somalis because, to them, it seemed like a religious confrontation between Muslims and Ethiopian Christians.

Furthermore, when Ethiopia intervened in the Somali conflict, especially when Ethiopia troops helped the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to fight against its violent competitors and Al-Shabaab, it created intense hostility from the Somalis who saw them as a long-time enemy since they had religious differences and were viewed as Christians who had come to oppress them in their own country. Apart from that, there was a lack of support from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), created with the assistance of Ethiopia and Western powers. They were seen as lacking in Islamic values and instead taking up secular values. For this reason, Islamist movements were able to mobilize Somalis in fighting against these governments (Nyamwaya 2014, p. 52).

The character of the uncontrollable civil war in Somalia is changing; according to George Sebastian Holzer, for the first time, Sufi groups under assault armed and effectively battle Al-Shabaab in central Somalia with popular backing. The possibility of changing dynamics in the long term is a new axis of conflict in which Islamic warriors battle along religious lines. Sub-Sufi leaders had been able, during the previous two decades of civil conflict, to eliminate clan and political battles from Somalia until the militants of Al-Shabaab began defacing their holy sanctuaries in the south of the nation at the end of last year when this pragmatic moderate strategy ends.

The policies of Al-Shabaab in Port of Kismayo, an important business center, have provided an impressive example. They have also attacked Al-Shabaab, which has taken down a 60-year-old abandoned Roman Catholic Church and replaced it with a Mushek and targeted Sufi areas,

including ancient clerical and sepulchers, which are other prominent Sufi sites. Moreover, on 7 May 2000, Al-Shabaab rebels launched an FSL attack in Mogadishu's Capital just a couple of blocks from the presidential palace of Villa Somalia (Holzer 2009).

Therefore, the existence of different ideologies among Muslims in Somalia leads to the escalation of conflict, since those Muslims who support the government in a quest for peace, the extremists view them as traitors. This fact has also contributed to the sustained conflict. Religion in Somalia has been seen to contribute to governance. To this effect, one can note that in the debate on conflict and peace in the world, religion and politics are distinct but not distinct (Farah 2010, p. 44–47).

Religion as a Resource for Conflict in Somalia

Since independence in 1960 and the establishment of new government including with the national institutions has failed to satisfy the expectations of people, this due to the increased poverty and security deteriorated. Moreover, governmental institutions were marked by corruption, nepotism and colonialism. Therefore, when the military administration was ruled by Siad Barre in October 1969, made the situation to be worse, which resulted the emergence of deadly Somalia civil war.

Due to the dynamism of Somalia war from warlord to the rise of Islam militancy, religion has been used as a resource of escalation of conflict in Somalia, since those parties who have interests in conflict, they use religion as an arena of illustrate their grievance. Therefore, religion has been used as a device to conflict in the hand of those who utilize religion is a strong tool (Haar et al. 2005, p. 31). Islamic militant groups such as the Al-Shabaab have used religion to propagate their agenda and to even recruit new members (Smock 2008, p. 3). Surely one cannot dismiss the emotional needs that may be met by a particular spiritual image (Haar et al. 2005, p. 31). Hence Al-Shabaab group preach Jihadist's as an easy way to get rewards of paradise from God, the most common method in which religion is utilized in the perspective of others and used mistakenly nowadays is undoubtedly political manipulation of religion (Haar et al. 2005, p. 5).

To these circumstances it's important to recognize those components in a certain religious tradition which can make a substantial contribution to resolving social and political disputes, helping the establishment of a lasting peace (Haar et al. 2005, p. 19). Religious participation in peace-building efforts may equip and range practitioners and diplomats for conflict resolution for a very pro-active role in conflict transformation. This can give a spiritual framework for change and compensate for the mechanical approaches for resolving conflicts (Bercovitch et al. 2009, p. 274).

Participants in the process of reconciling warring parties frequently look in a specific manner to religion as both religious elements can be perceived to contribute to conflicts, not just because religions can contribute to profound traditions of peace-making and peace-making (Marshall et al. 2007, p. 280).

Roles of clan leaders in Somalia peace building

Somalia is one of Africa's ethnically, religiously, and culturally uniform countries (Lewis 1999; Samatar 1999). In Somalia, there are six main clan families: Dir, Isaq, Darod, Hawiye, Digil, and Rahanweyn (Abbibk 1999). The other two, Digil and Rahanweyn, are the Sab, are involved in agriculture, and makeup over 30 percent of the population. Four of them are primarily pastoral clans and are known as Samaal, the Dir, Darod, Isaaq, and Hawiye, constituting some 70% of Somalia's population (Metz 1992).

Somalia's civilization has been following an amalgamation of clans in which individuals trace their forebears for thousands of years (Walls 2010; Kibble 2010). About family/families, Michael Walls pointed out that social structures are determined by Kinship, notably for pre-state companies. In Somalia, people live in kinship/clan localities, and the sub-clans split every clan hierarchy. The clan's principal task is to act as a mediator and peacemaker within the community or as a traditional elder or head of the clan in his clan and with other clans. Historically clan policy gained complete ability to manage the management of the clan issues after the colonial leaders were seized by nationalist Somali politicians (Catherine 1996, p. 581). The political clans have continued to play a beneficial part in Somalia policy may still be witnessed in oral tradition and clan rivalry. Prior to Somalia's collapse, power was mediated in rural communities through the traditional chiefs and elders supported by public security institutions, and most informal governance in Somalia relied on traditional management sources such as customary (xeer), groups of blood payment (diya), and lines or clan affiliations (Issaka et al. 2007, p. 35). In Traditional Somalia, elders had a crucial role in peace-building and rules on relationships between and within local communities. In such circumstances, Somalia was seen as one of the safest places to live in Africa before the 1980s as a result of the social cohesiveness that resolved its disputes using mediation or arbitration by the clan elders, who would be a case in point for International aids organizations seeking to construct justice, police and Somalia's trading capabilities (Menkhaus 2003, p. 412).

The country became weak after the fall of the administration of Siad Barre in January 1991, as its tribes were divided. In Somalia's culture and politics, clan membership plays a key role. The clans have been so split that they cannot get together to establish a government. A civil war led to a humanitarian emergency (Siad Barre's fall blamed for Somalia's collapse... 2015). Complicated and competitive interests of the individual and the clan characterize Somalia's conflicts. The clans in Somalia are divided into clan ties or alliances between the clans that are created to defend and safeguard mutual interests. According to interviews with Somalis in Nairobi, Kenya, many say Somalia's problem might be one excess of clans and clans fighting for power, and the main component of the social contract or the "xeer" is that they build their alliances together. These aliens are seen as disadvantaged and subject to assault by the prevailing clans. The Hawiye, for instance, is the most prominent ruling clan and has many other subclans, including Abgaal, Habargedir, Hawadle, Mursade, Rahwein, Murule, Ajuran and Garre, with their subclans too. The Darod has subclans of the Harti, Marehan, and Ogaden on the opposite side (Siad Barre's fall blamed for Somalia's collapse... 2015).

The authority divide between the Marehan and Ogaden over Jubaland and Kismayu illustrates how the sub-clans struggle to be powerful. However, they both endorse Darod for more significant influence over the government in Somalia. Even though the Harti sub-clans include the Majerten, they have the power to control Puntland (Siad Barre's fall blamed for Somalia's collapse... 2015).

Reality speaking, different peace-building conferences in Somalia have failed to deal with genuine concerns and have been used to promote those interests as the process is inclusive and participatory for those clans who influence the Somalia crisis. Besteman and Cassanelli believe that despite a government and security forces presence, the elders still have a role in Legislation and order, relying on common law and Sharia legislation (Besteman 2000, p 42, Cassanelli 2000, p 42). Therefore, traditionally, the clan elders are responsible for the peaceful cooperation of the entire community and the resolution of local problems and even national level since they are the ones who have the capacity to bring together all groups who lead the escalation of the conflict, for example, Those entrepreneurs and activist leaders in their area of responsibility in round table talks on peacekeeping. Any attempt to analyze Somalia cannot thus be considered as a whole without the clan leaders' participation because they play a significant role in conflict management and Somalia's search for good peace (Besteman 2000, p. 42; Cassanelli 2000, p. 42).

In conclusion, Steadman maintains that just one side in conflict reconciliation was the worst error of outsider mediators since 1991, especially those clans affiliated with the central government and disregarding traditional elders. The international negotiations have again made blunders in focusing on brokering power-sharing agreements, which include power-sharing agreements that are founded without other traditional elders (Stedman 1997, p. 27). For example, during the establishment of an interim government after the collapse of the Barre government, the international negotiators based on the side of Ali Mahid Mohammed, who served as president of Somalia's interim government; this led to increased hostility on the side of General Farrah Mohammed Aidid and others clans leaders who support Aidid (Wood House 2013, p. 163; Oliver 2013, p. 163). Due to these circumstances, traditional elders are important actors who have exerted influence on the crisis in Somalia because it consists of a unique collection of escalating pressures that cause a war to stand.

Conclusion

Since the reign of the Siyad Barre government, Somalis have not experienced positive administration that helped to fulfill their demands; the most notable reason that led to the escalation of political instability in Somalia was the power hunger of the clan leaders and religious issues. As explained at the beginning, Somalis share a common culture, language, and even religion; this collective identity forms a robust foundation for Somali society, fostering a sense of cohesion and interconnectedness among its people. Hence, it is important for the current government, with the support of international institutions, to understand the importance and role of all actors who have considerable interests in Somalia conflict during negotiation for peace-building in Somalia because the conflict in Somalia is not limited within its borders; instead, it across within the

region as well, immensely impacting humanitarian efforts, shaping regional political dynamics, and influencing economic instability. The interconnectedness of these consequences underscores the need for a comprehensive and collaborative regional approach to address the multifaceted challenges posed by the ongoing conflict in Somalia.

Furthermore, as explained above, religious actor in Somalia has been used as an instrument in the escalation of the conflict; hence, peacebuilders must acknowledge the need for religion, especially its instruments in conflict, and the ways they are applied to peace-building. Currently, Islamism has a great contribution to the exacerbation of the conflict in Somalia since it is the source of that extremely Islamic movement, which has the aim of establishing the Islamic state of Somalia that will follow Sharia law.

Bibliography

- AALEN, Lovise (2013). *Getting Somalia Wrong?: faith, war and hope in a shattered state*. (Rapid Literature review). Mery Harper: London Zed Books, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 224 p. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X13000098>.
- ABBINK, Jan (1999). *The total Somali clan genealogy: a preliminary sketch*. (ASC Workingpaper 41/1999). [online] Leiden: AfricaStudies centre. Available at: <https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/access/item%3A3145779/view>.
- ABDI, Mohamed Ali (2012). *Conflict resolution and nation-building in Somalia*. Bloomington: Xlibris Corporation, 2012, 146 p.
- ABDULKADIR, Farah – ABDULLAHI, Abdurahaman - NUR, Yusuf (eds.) (2011). *Somalia exploring a Way out*. Nairobi: A National Civic forum 2011, 90 p.
- AVIS, William – HERBERT, Siân (2016). *Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Somalia*. (Rapid Literature-Review). [online] Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2016, p. 44. Available at: https://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Fragility_Migration_Somalia.pdf.
- BERCOVITCH, Jacob – KREMENYUK, Victor – ZARTMAN, William (eds.) (2009). *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*. [online] London, Sage Publications 2009, 682 p. DOI: 10.4135/9780857024701.
- BESTEMAN, Catherine – CASSANELLI, Lee (eds.) (2000). *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: the War behind the War*. [online] London: Haan 2000, 222 p. Available at: https://openlibrary.org/books/OL18305110M/The_struggle_for_land_in_southern_Somalia.
- BESTEMAN, Catherine (1996). Violent Politics and the Politics of Violence. The dissolution of the Somali nation-state. In *American Ethnologist*, 23, 3, pp. 579–596.
- BRADBURY, Mark – HEALY, Sally (eds.) (2010). Whose Peace Is It Anyway? Connecting Somali and International Peacemaking. In *Accord. An International Review of Peace Initiatives*, issue 21. [online] London: Conciliation Resources, 2010. Available at: <https://allafrica.com/view/resource/main/main/id/00020075.html>.
- DIPRIZIO, Robert (2002). *Armed humanitarians: US interventions from northern Iraq to Kosovo*. Baltimore: JHU Press, 2002, 256 p.
- FOLTZ, Zachary Devlin (2010). Africa's fragile states; Empowering Extremists, Exporting Terrorism. [online] In *Africa Security Brief no. 6*. Available at: <https://africacenter.org/publication/africas-fragile-states-empowering-extremists-exporting-terrorism/#author>.
- FOX, Jonathan - SANDLER, Shmeul (2006). *Religion in World Conflict*. London Routledge 2006, 2020 p.
- HAAR, Gerrie Ter (2005): Religion: Source of Conflict or Resource for Peace? In HAAR, Gerrie Ter – BUSUTTIL, J. (eds.). *Bridge or Barrier. Religion, Violence and Visions for Peace*. Leiden: Brill, 2005, pp. 3–34. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789047405733_004.
- HAMMOND, Laura (2013). Somalia rising things are starting to change for the worlds longest failed state. In *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 7, 1, pp. 183–193. DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2012.755316.

- HOLZER, Georg Sebastian (2009). *Somalia's new religious war*. [online] Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report-somalia/somalias-new-religious-war>.
- INGIRIIS, Mohamed Haji (2014). *Afyare Abdi Elmi. Understanding the Somalia conflagration: Identity, political Islam and peace building*. In *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review*, 4, 1, pp. 139–142.
- JEFFREY, Clark (1993). Debacle in Somalia. In *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 1, pp. 109–123.
- MENKHAUS, Kenneth (2003). State Collapse in Somalia. Second Thoughts. In *Review of African Political Economy*, 30, 97, pp. 405–422.
- MENKHAUS, Kenneth (2007). The crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in five acts. In *African Affairs*, 106, 424, pp. 357–390.
- MENKHAUS, Kenneth (2005). Somalia and Somaliland; Terrorism, Political Islam and State collapse. In ROTBERG, Robert I. (ed.) *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*. Washington: Brooklyn Institute press 2005, pp. 23–47.
- KHAYRE, Ahmed Ali (2017). Somalia: making human rights central to the state rebuilding. In *Conflict Studies Quarterly*, 21, October 2017, pp. 22–49.
- LEWIS, Ioan – SAMATAR, Said (1999). *A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*. Oxford: International Africa Institute, James Carry publishers, 1999, 320 p.
- LEWIS, Ioan (1988). *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. London: Longman, 1998, 279 p.
- MAKAN, Jami – BARASA, Lucas (2008). Igad Gives Somalia Nine Months to Act. [online] Available at: <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-/1056/485340/-/tliedd/-/index.html>.
- MARSHALL, Katherine, VAN, Saanen, MARISA (2007). *Development and faith: Where Mind, Heart and Soul Work together*. Washington DC: The World Bank, 2007, 280 p.
- METZ, Helen (1993). *Somalia a Country Study*. Washington, D.C: Federal Research Division, 1993, 346 p.
- MULUGETA, Kidist (2010). *The role of regional and international organizations in resolving the Somali conflict: the case of IGAD*. [online] Addis Ababa: Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, 2010, 59 p. Available at: <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/aethiopien/07937-book.pdf>.
- NYAMWAYA, Priya (2014). *The Role of Religion in Conflict and Management, the Case of Somalia, 1999 – 2012*. Nairobi: University of Nairobi, 2014, 99 p.
- OSMAN, Abdulah – ISSAKA, Souare (2007). *Somalia at the Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives in Reconstituting a Failed State*. London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers, 2007, 242 p.
- ØSTEBØ, Terje (2012). Islamic Militancy in Africa. [online] In *Africa Security Brief No. 23*. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/2096303/Islamic_Militancy_in_Africa.
- SAMATAR, Abdi (2016). *Africa's First Democrats: Somalia's Aden A. Osman and Abdirizak H. Hussein*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016, 308 p. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt2005vzv>.
- SMOCK, David (2008). Religion in World Affairs: It's Role in Conflict and Peace. [online] In *Special Report*, no. 201, United States Institute of Peace, February 2008. Available at: <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/sr201.pdf>.
- STEDMAN, Stephen John (1997). The Spoiler Problem in Peace. In *Processes International Security*, 22, 2, pp. 5–53.
- SVENSON, Isak (2012). *Ending holy wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil War*. Brisbane: University of Queensland, 2012, 360 p.
- WALLS, Michael – KIBBLE, Steve (2010). Beyond Polarity: Negotiating a Hybrid State in Somaliland. In *Africa Spectrum*, 45, 1, 31–56 p.
- Siad Barre's fall blamed for Somalia's collapse into Civil War* (2011). [online] In *WOA*. Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/siad-barre-fall-led-into-civil-war-020111-115008454/134345.html>.
- WILLIAM, Paul (2011). *War and Conflict in Africa*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011, 320 p.
- WOODHOUSE, Tom – RAMSBOTHAM, Oliver (2013). *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*. London: Routledge, 2013, 280 p.